STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
The maximum latency of selfish routing
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA)
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
How Hard Is It to Find Extreme Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games?
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
Approximation and Online Algorithms
The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
Theoretical Computer Science
How hard is it to find extreme Nash equilibria in network congestion games?
Theoretical Computer Science
How to find Nash equilibria with extreme total latency in network congestion games?
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
The equilibrium existence problem in finite network congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Atomic selfish routing in networks: a survey
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
On the existence of nash equilibria in strategic search games
TGC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Trustworthy Global Computing
Probabilistic techniques in algorithmic game theory
SAGA'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Stochastic Algorithms: foundations and applications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays only once and allocates her traffic to a path selected via a shortest path computation. We then show that this algorithm works for series-parallel networks when users are identical or when users are of varying demands but have the same best response strategy for any initial network traffic. We also give constructions where the algorithm fails if either the above condition is violated (even for series-parallel networks) or the network is not series-parallel (even for identical users). Thus, we essentially indicate the limits of the applicability of this greedy approach. We also study the price of anarchy for the objective of maximum latency. We prove that for any network of m uniformly related links and for identical users, the price of anarchy is ${\it \Theta}({\frac{{\rm log} m}{{\rm log log} m}}$).