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Selfish routing with atomic players
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games
Algorithmica
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Strong price of anarchy for machine load balancing
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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We consider the existence of Partition Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games. Super-strong equilibrium, where no subset of players has an incentive to change their strategies collectively, does not always exist in such games. We show, however, that partition equilibrium (introduced in [4] to model coalitions arising in a social context) always exists in general resource selection games, as well as how to compute it efficiently. In a partition equilibrium, the set of players has a fixed partition into coalitions, and the only deviations considered are by coalitions that are sets in this partition. Our algorithm to compute a partition equilibrium in any resource selection game (i.e., load balancing game) settles the open question from [4] about existence of partition equilibrium in general resource selection games. Moreover, we show how to always find a partition equilibrium which is also a Nash equilibrium. This implies that in resource selection games, we do not need to sacrifice the stability of individual players when forming solutions stable against coalitional deviations. In addition, while super-strong equilibrium may not exist in resource selection games, we show that its existence can be decided efficiently, and how to find one if it exists.