Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Price of anarchy for cognitive MAC games
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
A game-theoretic analysis of inter-session network coding
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Bargaining and price-of-anarchy in repeated inter-session network coding games
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
On the efficiency of markets with two-sided proportional allocation mechanisms
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Congestion games with variable demands
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency
Operations Research
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
On the efficiency of the simplest pricing mechanisms in two-sided markets
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
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The design of pricing mechanisms for network resource allocation has two important objectives: 1) a simple and scalable end-to-end implementation and 2) efficiency of the resulting equilibria. Both objectives are met by certain recently proposed mechanisms when users are price taking, but not when users can anticipate the effects of their actions on the resulting prices. In this paper, we partially close this gap, by demonstrating an alternative resource allocation mechanism which is scalable and guarantees a fully efficient allocation when users are price taking. In addition, when links have affine marginal cost, this mechanism has efficiency loss bounded by 1/3 when users are price anticipating. These results are derived by studying Cournot games, and in the process we derive the first nontrivial constant factor bounds on efficiency loss in these well-studied economic models.