Pricing in computer networks: reshaping the research agenda
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Charging communication networks: from theory to practice
Charging communication networks: from theory to practice
The economics of network management
Communications of the ACM
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Efficiency loss in market mechanisms for resource allocation
Efficiency loss in market mechanisms for resource allocation
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
How well can congestion pricing neutralize denial of service attacks?
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGMETRICS/PERFORMANCE joint international conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
On the efficiency of the simplest pricing mechanisms in two-sided markets
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We analyze the performance of resource allocation mechanisms for markets in which there is competition amongst both consumers and suppliers (namely, two-sided markets). Specifically, we examine a natural generalization of both Kelly's proportional allocation mechanism for demand-competitive markets [9] and Johari and Tsitsiklis' proportional allocation mechanism for supply-competitive markets [7]. We first consider the case of a market for one divisible resource. Assuming that marginal costs are convex, we derive a tight bound on the price of anarchy of about 0.5887. This worst case bound is achieved when the demand-side of the market is highly competitive and the supply-side consists of a duopoly. As more firms enter the market, the price of anarchy improves to 0.64. In contrast, on the demand side, the price of anarchy improves when the number of consumers decreases, reaching a maximum of 0.7321 in a monopsony setting. When the marginal cost functions are concave, the above bound smoothly degrades to zero as the marginal costs tend to constants. For monomial cost functions of the form C(x) = cx1+1/d, we show that the price of anarchy is Ω(1/d2). We complement these guarantees by identifying a large class of twosided single-parameter market-clearing mechanisms among which the proportional allocation mechanism uniquely achieves the optimal price of anarchy. We also prove that our worst case bounds extend to general multi-resource markets, and in particular to bandwidth markets over arbitrary networks.