Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the performance of user equilibria in traffic networks
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approximate strong equilibrium in job scheduling games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Structured coalitions in resource selection games
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)
SIROCCO'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines
Discrete Applied Mathematics
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The quality of Nash equilibria in network formations games has recently been analyzed in the case of uncoordinated players. In this paper we study how the price of anarchy of network formation games with Shapley cost allocation is affected by allowing locally coordinated coalitions of players. In a distributed setting not all users can communicate and form coalitions, at least they have to know that the others exist. Here, we assume that the users can form a coalition when they share a resource, i.e., in our case a group of users that share an edge can form a coalition. We show that this assumption is strong enough to decrease the price of anarchy from Θ(k) to Θ(log k) in the one terminal undirected case, where every vertex node is associated with a player and k is the number of players. Whereas in the directed or multi terminal case local communication does not necessary lead to a better price of anarchy. We additionally show that in the directed case the price of stability increases from Θ(log k) to Θ(k).