Approximation algorithms
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
The complexity of equilibria in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
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We study Facility Location games played by n agents situated on the nodes of a graph. Each agent orders installation of a facility at a node of the graph and pays connection cost to the chosen node, and shares fairly facility installation cost with other agents having chosen the same location. This game has pure strategy Nash equilibria, that can be found by simple improvements performed by the agents iteratively. We show that this algorithm may need super-polynomial $\Omega(2^{n^{\frac{1}{2}}})$ steps to converge. For metric graphs we show that approximate pure equilibria can be found in polynomial time. On metric graphs we consider additionally strong equilibria; previous work had shown that they do not always exist. We upper bound the overall (social) cost of *** -approximate strong equilibria within a factor O (*** ln *** ) of the optimum, for every *** *** 1.