Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Non-Cooperative Multicast and Facility Location Games
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Improved equilibria via public service advertising
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
Equilibrium selection in multistage congestion games for real-time streaming
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
An improved competitive algorithm for reordering buffer management
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Stackelberg strategies for network design games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The complexity of equilibria in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We consider a multicast game played by a set of selfish noncooperative players (i.e., nodes) on a rooted undirected graph. Players arrive one by one and each connects to the root by greedily choosing a path minimizing its cost; the cost of using an edge is split equally among all users using the edge. How large can the sum of the players' costs be, compared to the cost of a "socially optimal" solution, defined to be a minimum Steiner tree connecting the players to the root? We show that the ratio is O(log2 n) and ©(log n), when there are n players. One can view this multicast game as a variant of Online Steiner Tree with a different cost sharing mechanism. Furthermore, we consider what happens if the players, in a second phase, are allowed to change their paths in order to decrease their costs. Thus, in the second phase players play best response dynamics until eventually a Nash equilibrium is reached. We show that the price of anarchy is O(log 3 n) and ©(log n). We also make progress towards understanding the challenging case where arrivals and path changes by existing terminals are interleaved. In particular, we analyze the interesting special case where the terminals fire in random order and prove that the cost of the solution produced (with arbitrary interleaving of actions) is at most O(polylog(n)√n) times the optimum.