A General Approximation Technique for Constrained Forest Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Improved Results for Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
SIAM Journal on Computing
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Online multicast with egalitarian cost sharing
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Theoretical Computer Science
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
An improved LP-based approximation for steiner tree
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We consider the Network Design game introduced by Anshelevich et al. [1] in which n source-destination pairs must be connected by n respective players equally sharing the cost of the used links. By considering the classical Sum social function corresponding to the total network cost, it is well known that the price of anarchy for this class of games may be as large as n. One approach for reducing this bound is that of resorting on the Stackelberg model in which for a subset of ⌊αn⌋ coordinated players, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, communication paths inducing better equilibria are fixed. In this paper we show the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies by providing optimal and nearly optimal bounds on the performance achievable by such strategies. In particular, differently from previous works, we are also able to provide Stackelberg strategies computable in polynomial time and lowering the price of anarchy from n to 2(1/α +1). Most of the results are extended to the social function MAX, in which the maximum player cost is considered.