Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Packet reordering is not pathological network behavior
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Polynomial Time Mechanisms for Collective Decision Making
Polynomial Time Mechanisms for Collective Decision Making
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On selfish routing in internet-like environments
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Theoretical Computer Science
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Approximation and Online Algorithms
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Stackelberg strategies for network design games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
The price of optimum in a matching game
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Experimental results for stackelberg scheduling strategies
WEA'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Experimental and Efficient Algorithms
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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We continue the study initiated in [13] on Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies. We are given a set of m independent parallel machines or equivalently a set of m parallel edges, each with a load dependent latency function. The setting is that of a non-cooperative game: players route their flow so as minimize their individual latencies. Additionally, there is a single player (the leader), who controls an a fraction of the total flow. The goal is to find a strategy for the leader (i.e. an assignment of flow to individual links) such that the selfish users react so as to minimize the total latency of the system. Building on the recent results in [13,14], we devise a fully polynomial approximate Stackelberg scheme that runs in time poly(m, 1/驴) and results in an assignment whose cost is within a (1 + 驴) factor of the optimum Stackelberg strategy. We also study the generalization to multiple rounds. It is easy to see that more than two rounds do not help. We show that the two round Stackelberg strategy (denoted 2SS) always dominates the one round scheme. We also consider extensions of the above results to special graphs, and special kind of latency functions.