Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games

  • Authors:

  • Dimitris Fotakis

  • Affiliations:

  • Dept. of Information and Communication Systems Engineering, University of the Aegean, Samos, Greece

  • Venue:
  • ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We investigate the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands. In our setting, only a fraction of the players are selfish, while the rest are willing to follow a predetermined strategy. A Stackelberg strategy assigns the coordinated players to appropriately selected strategies trying to minimize the performance degradation due to the selfish players. We consider two orthogonal cases, namely linear congestion games with arbitrary strategies and congestion games on parallel links with arbitrary non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions.We restrict our attention to pure Nash equilibria and derive strong upper and lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy under different Stackelberg strategies.