The price of anarchy for minsum related machine scheduling

Authors:
Ruben Hoeksma;Marc Uetz
Affiliations:
Dept. Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands;Dept. Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
Venue:
WAOA'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Year:
2011

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Abstract

We address the classical uniformly related machine scheduling problem with minsum objective. The problem is solvable in polynomial time by the algorithm of Horowitz and Sahni. In that solution, each machine sequences its jobs shortest first. However when jobs may choose the machine on which they are processed, while keeping the same sequencing rule per machine, the resulting Nash equilibria are in general not optimal. The price of anarchy measures this optimality gap. By means of a new characterization of the optimal solution, we show that the price of anarchy in this setting is bounded from above by 2. We also give a lower bound of e/(e−1)≈1.58. This complements recent results on the price of anarchy for the more general unrelated machine scheduling problem, where the price of anarchy equals 4. Interestingly, as Nash equilibria coincide with shortest processing time first (SPT) schedules, the same bounds hold for SPT schedules. Thereby, our work also fills a gap in the literature.