Coordination mechanism for selfish scheduling under a grade of service provision

Authors:
Li Guan;Jianping Li
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, Yunnan University, Kunming 650091, PR China;Department of Mathematics, Yunnan University, Kunming 650091, PR China
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2013

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Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of selfish scheduling game under a grade of service provision, where all machines and all jobs are labeled with the different grade of service (GoS) levels such that a job J can be assigned to execute on machine M only when the GoS level of machine M is not higher than the GoS level of job J. We consider two coordination mechanisms for this selfish scheduling game: the makespan policy and the LG-LPT policy. For the first mechanism, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 32 for two machines and @Q(logmloglogm) for m(=3) machines, respectively. For the second mechanism, we point out that the price of anarchy is 54 for two machines and 2-1m-1 for m(=3) machines, respectively, and we finally analyze the convergence to a Nash equilibrium of the induced game.