Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On incentive compatible competitive selection protocol
COCOON'06 Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
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This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. This new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Supposing all participators are rational, how does one allocate the objects and at what price so as to maximize the auctioneer's revenue. We introduce new kinds of mechanisms called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms is that each bidder's self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.