Item pricing for revenue maximization

Authors:
Maria-Florina Balcan;Avrim Blum;Yishay Mansour
Affiliations:
Microsoft Research, New England;Carnegie Mellon University;Google Inc. and Tel Aviv University
Venue:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Year:
2008

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Abstract

In this note we report recent results on item pricing for revenue maximization in the presence of buyers with complex, unknown preferences. We focus on two important classes of settings: buyers with general valuations for the case of items in unlimited supply, and buyers with subadditive valuations for the case of items in limited supply.