Interactive proofs and the hardness of approximating cliques
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
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This paper characterizes the family of truthful double-sided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful double-sided auctions was made. This paper characterizes truthful mechanisms for double-sided auctions by generalizing Roberts classic result [18], to show that truthful double-sided auctions must "almost" be affine maximizers. Our main result of characterizing double-sided auctions required the creation of a new set of tools, reductions that preserve economic properties. This paper utilizes two such reductions; a truth-preserving reduction and a non-affine preserving reduction. The truth-preserving reduction is used to reduce the double-sided auction to a special case of a combinatorial auction to make use of the impossibility result proved in [11]. Intuitively, our proof shows that truthful double-sided auctions are as hard to design as truthful combinatorial auctions. Two important concepts are developed in addition to the main result. First, the form of reduction used in this paper is of independent interest as it provides a means for comparing mechanism design problems by design difficulty. Second, we define the notion of extension of payments; which given a set of payments for some players finds payments for the remaining players. The extension payments maintain the truthful and affine maximization properties.