Discovering personal probabilities when utility functions are unknown
Management Science
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Given a set of alternatives and a single player, we introduce the notion of a responsive lottery. These mechanisms receive as input from the player a reported utility function, specifying a value for each one of the alternatives, and use a lottery to produce as output a probability distribution over the alternatives. Thereafter, exactly one alternative wins (is given to the player) with the respective probability. Assuming that the player is not indifferent to which of the alternatives wins, a lottery rule is called truthful dominant if reporting his true utility function (up to affine transformations) is the unique report that maximizes the expected payoff for the player. We design truthful dominant responsive lotteries. We also discuss their relations with scoring rules and with VCG mechanisms.