Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing randomized allocations
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the competitive ratio of online sampling auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by an omniscient seller selling at a fixed price to at least two customers), with a view to understanding how much lower the mechanism's revenue is than the benchmark, in the worst case. We study this issue in the context of lotteries, where the seller may sell a probability of winning an item. We are interested in two general issues. Firstly, we aim at using the true optimum revenue as benchmark for our auctions. Secondly, we study the extent to which the expressive power resulting from lotteries, helps to improve the worst-case ratio. We study this in the well-known context of digital goods. We show that in this scenario, collusion-resistant lotteries (these are lotteries for which no coalition of bidders exchanging side payments has an advantage in lying) are as powerful as truthful ones.