Convex Optimization
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Characterizing truthful mechanisms with convex type spaces
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
The Price of Malice in Linear Congestion Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The effects of altruism and spite on games
The effects of altruism and spite on games
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We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems, including the design of externality resistant auctions and a variant of multi-dimensional scheduling.