Monotone properties of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions

Authors:
Aries Wei Sun
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong
Venue:
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Year:
2007

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Abstract

In this paper, we give the definition of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions. Then we define three monotone properties of such auctions and study the implication relationships among them. This paper extends our previous work [4] which was focused on deterministic symmetric incentive compatible auctions.