Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
Decision Support Systems
Designing online auctions with past performance information
Decision Support Systems
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Ex Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions
Information Systems Research
Cooperative or vindictive: bidding strategies in sponsored search auction
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
A dynamic model of bidding patterns in sponsored search auctions
Information Technology and Management
Cyclical Bid Adjustments in Search-Engine Advertising
Management Science
Optimal keyword auctions for optimal user experiences
Decision Support Systems
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A keyword auction is conducted by Internet search engines to sell advertising slots listed on the search results page. Although much of the literature assumes the dynamic bidding strategy that utilizes the current bids of other advertisers, such information is, in practice, not available for participants in the auction. This paper explores the bidding behavior of advertisers in a sealed-bid environment, where each bidder does not know the current bids of others. This study considers secure bidding with a trial bid (SBT) as the bid adjustment process used by the advertisers, which is functional in a sealed-bid environment. It is shown that the SBT bid adjustment process converges to some equilibrium point in a one-shot game irrespective of the initial bid profile. Simulation results verify that a sealed-bid environment would be beneficial to search engines.