The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Robust multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
A new secure and efficient M+1st price auction scheme based on ECC system
ASID'09 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Anti-Counterfeiting, security, and identification in communication
UAI'01 Proceedings of the Seventeenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
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Electronic Commerce (EC) has rapidly grown with the expansion of the Internet. Among these activities, auctions have recently achieved huge popularity, and have become a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an infrastructure for much cheaper auctioning with many more sellers and buyers, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., an agent tries to get some profit by submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Although false-name bids are easier to execute than forming collusion, the vulnerability of auction protocols to false-name bids has not been discussed before.In this paper, we examine the robustness of the generalized Vickrey auction (G.V.A.) against false-name bids. The G.V.A. has the best theoretical background among various auction mechanisms, i.e., it has proved to be incentive compatible and be able to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation. We show that false-name bids may be effective, i.e., the G.V.A. loses incentive compatibility under the possibility of false-name bids, when the marginal utility of an item increases or goods are complementary. Moreover, we prove that there exists no single-round sealed-bid auction protocol that simultaneously satisfies individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and incentive compatibility in all cases if agents can submit false-name bids.