Binary Vickrey auction - A robust and efficient multi-unit sealed-bid online auction protocol against buyer multi-identity bidding

Authors:
Zoltán Hidvégi;Wenli Wang;Andrew B. Whinston
Affiliations:
Center for Research on Electronic Commerce Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, United States;Department of Management Information Systems College of Business University of Nevada at Las Vegas Las Vegas, NV, 89154, United States;Center for Research on Electronic Commerce Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, United States
Venue:
Decision Support Systems
Year:
2007

Citing 8
Cited 3

A limitation of the generalized Vickrey auction in electronic commerce: robustness against false-name bids

AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids

Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
The Impact of Discrete Bidding and Bidder Aggressiveness on Sellers' Strategies in Open English Auctions: Reserves and Covert Shilling

Marketing Science
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids

ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents

WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Designing Mechanisms for E-Commerce Security: An Example from Sealed-Bid Auctions

International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Time bounds for selection

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

A secure double auction protocol against false bids

Decision Support Systems
A public procurement combinatorial auction mechanism with quality assignment

Decision Support Systems
Vickrey vs. eBay: Why Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions Lead to More Realistic Price-Demand Functions

International Journal of Electronic Commerce

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The multi-unit Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism has two major weaknesses: it has high computational complexity and monotonicity problems [Paul Milgrom. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004] such that if goods are not substitutes for all bidders and if a bidder can submit bids under multiple identities, then the VCG is no longer strategy-proof. To address these two weaknesses, we introduce a Binary Vickrey Auction (BVA) where goods are allocated in bundles of sequentially-decreasing power-of-two items in multiple rounds. Because of the discrete allocation operations, the BVA is computationally efficient. It is also robust against buyer multi-identity bidding by discouraging a bidder splitting his single bid for a larger bundle into several bids under multiple bidder identities for smaller bundles because the BVA favors bids for larger bundles with earlier considerations and cheaper prices.