Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Relationship Between Breaking the Diffie--Hellman Protocol and Computing Discrete Logarithms
SIAM Journal on Computing
A Practical English Auction with One-Time Registration
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Robust, Privacy Protecting and Publicly Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Non-interactive Private Auctions
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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M. Yokoo et al. analyzed some weaknesses in McAfee's double auction (MCD) protocol and proposed a robust threshold price double auction (TPD) protocol against false-name bids. Unfortunately, as their protocol strongly depends on the trust of auctioneer, the auctioneer's misbehavior may fail an auction process. In addition, their scheme is in fact not robust in terms of comprehensive false bids. In this paper, we further investigate weaknesses in both MCD and TPD protocols, and then propose an improved double auction protocol against false bids. We also extend it for a practical and secure double auction implementation. This is based on a hybrid trust model, where computation load is distributed to buyers and sellers while a semi-trusted manager handles the registration phase. A prominent feature of the extended protocol is its high robustness, achieved by using a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme with threshold access structure.