The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An Online Public Auction Protocol Protecting Bidder Privacy
ACISP '00 Proceedings of the 5th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
An Anonymous Electronic Bidding Protocol Based on a New Convertible Group Signature Scheme
ACISP '00 Proceedings of the 5th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
A Practical English Auction with One-Time Registration
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auction Using Hash Chain
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fair On-Line Auctions without Special Trusted Parties
FC '99 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Financial Cryptography
An Anonymous Aution Protocol with a Single Non-trusted Center Using Binary Trees
ISW '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Security
An Auction Protocol Which Hides Bids of Losers
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A secure double auction protocol against false bids
Decision Support Systems
Bidder-anonymous English auction scheme with privacy and public verifiability
Journal of Systems and Software
Fair anonymous rewarding based on electronic cash
Journal of Systems and Software
A secure e-auction scheme based on group signatures
Information Systems Frontiers
An Agent-Based English Auction Protocol Using Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem for Mobile Commerce
ICA3PP '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing
Practical electronic auction scheme with strong anonymity and bidding privacy
Information Sciences: an International Journal
An agent-based English auction protocol using Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem for mobile commerce
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
An improved double auction protocol against false bids
TrustBus'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trust, Privacy, and Security in Digital Business
A robust double auction protocol based on a hybrid trust model
ICISS'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Information Systems Security
Formal verification of e-auction protocols
POST'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Comment on Lee et al.'s group signature and e-auction scheme
Information Systems Frontiers
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In public auction, all bid values are published, but each bidder participates in auction protocol in anonymous way. Recently, Omote and Miyaji [OM01] proposed a new model of public auction in which any bidder can participate in plural rounds of auction with one-time registration. They have introduced two managers, registration manager (RM) and auction manager (AM), and have used efficient tools such as bulletin board and signature of knowledge [CS97].In this scheme, even if a bidder is identified as a winner in a round, he can participate in next rounds of auction maintaining anonymity for RM, AM, and any bidder. But a problem of this protocol is that the identity of winner cannot be published. In the winner announcement stage, RM informs the vendor of winner's identity secretly. Therefore RM's final role cannot be verified, and AM and any participating bidder can not be sure of the validity of auction.In this paper, we propose a new public auction scheme which can solve this problem. In the proposed scheme, both RM and AM execute randomization operation in round setup process which makes the publication of winner's identity be possible while keeping anonymity of winner in next rounds of auction. Moreover, AM provides ticket identifier based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement which is recognized only by the bidder. Our scheme provides real anonymity in plural rounds of auction with one-time registration in a verifiable way.