A Practical English Auction with One-Time Registration
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Robust, Privacy Protecting and Publicly Verifiable Sealed-Bid Auction
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
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M. Yokoo et al. analyzed some weaknesses in McAfee's double auction (MCD) protocol and proposed a robust threshold price double auction (TPD) protocol against false-name bids. Unfortunately, as their protocol strongly depends on the trust of auctioneer, the auctioneer's misbehavior may fail an auction process. In addition, their scheme is in fact not robust in terms of comprehensive false bids. In this paper, we further investigate weaknesses in both MCD and TPD protocols, and then propose an improved double auction protocol against false bids. We also extend it for a practical and secure double auction implementation.