The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Secret ballot elections in computer networks
Computers and Security
On blind signatures and perfect crimes
Computers and Security
Strong loss tolerance of electronic coin systems
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
A Practical English Auction with One-Time Registration
ACISP '01 Proceedings of the 6th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Efficient Public Auction with One-Time Registration and Public Verifiability
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
HICSS '97 Proceedings of the 30th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences: Information System Track-Organizational Systems and Technology - Volume 3
An Efficient Blind Signature Scheme for Information Hiding
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Anonymous Fair Transaction Protocols Based on Electronic Cash
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Certificate-free ad hoc anonymous authentication
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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This manuscript presents an anonymous rewarding protocol based on electronic cash. In the protocol, a reward provider publishes a problem to solicit a satisfactory solution of the problem. The provider offers a reward to the first person that can supply her/him a satisfactory solution of the problem. A reward claimant possesses a possible solution of the problem and sends her/his solution to the provider to claim the reward. Among all the claimants, the first qualified claimant is selected to obtain the reward. Not only is the privacy of the honest claimants, including the selected claimant, protected against the provider, but also the provider cannot decline the selected claimant her/his entitled reward without being detected after acquiring the solution from the claimant. Especially, if the provider can convince the message forwarding servers in the protocol that some malicious claimant has offered a forged solution to interfere with the rewarding process, these servers will help the provider to trace the dishonest claimant.