AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
ICDCS '00 Proceedings of the The 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ( ICDCS 2000)
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Robust multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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This paper presents a new false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol called Greedy ALlocation (GAL) protocol. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called Iterative Reducing (IR) protocol has been developed for multi-unit auctions and has proven to be false-name-proof, i.e., using false-name bids is useless. For Internet auction protocols, being false-name-proof is important since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible.One shortcoming of the IR protocol is that it requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine the reservation price for one unit. Our newly developed GAL protocol is easier to use than the IR, since the auctioneer does not need to set the reservation price nor any other parameters. The evaluation results show that the GAL protocol can obtain a social surplus that is very close to Pareto efficient. Furthermore, the obtained social surplus and seller's revenue are much better than those of the IR protocol even if the reservation price is set optimally.