Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Agent-human interactions in the continuous double auction
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
False-name bids in combinatorial auctions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We develop a new strategy-proof double auction protocol characterized as average-case budget-non-negative. It is well-known that there is no strategy-proof double auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and budget-balance simultaneously. The existing approach is to give up Pareto efficiency or strategy-proofness by enforcing budget-balance or budget-positive as a hard constraint. We propose a new direction to slightly relax the budget-non negative condition. Although this protocol might incur loss or profit in some cases, it is guaranteed not to exceed the predetermined amount of loss. Simulation results show that this protocol can be budget-non-negative on average and achieve social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient by setting parameters appropriately.