Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The POPCORN market—an online market for computational resources
Proceedings of the first international conference on Information and computation economies
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A futures market in computer time
Communications of the ACM
JaWS: An Open Market-Based Framework for Distributed Computing over the Internet
GRID '00 Proceedings of the First IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Grid Computing
A Case for Economy Grid Architecture for Service-Oriented Grid Computing
IPDPS '01 Proceedings of the 15th International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Market-Oriented Multiple Resource Scheduling in Grid Computing Environments
AINA '05 Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Volume 1
Double Auction Protocols for Resource Allocation in Grids
ITCC '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing (ITCC'05) - Volume I - Volume 01
Fine Grained Resource Reservation in Open Grid Economies
E-SCIENCE '06 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on e-Science and Grid Computing
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auction based Grid Resource Co-allocation Approach
SKG '07 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Semantics, Knowledge and Grid
Applying double auctions for scheduling of workflows on the Grid
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM/IEEE conference on Supercomputing
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To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equilibrium of demand and supply. As a new mechanism for grid resource allocation, GDAM is proved to be strategy-proof, economically efficient, weakly budget-balanced and individual rational. Simulation results also confirm that GDAM outperforms the traditional one on both the total trade amount and the user satisfaction percentage, specially as more users are involved in the auction market.