Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Artificial Intelligence
Infinite order Lorenz dominance for fair multiagent optimization
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
LP Solvable Models for Multiagent Fair Allocation Problems
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Generalized Partition Mechanism: Framework for Combining Multiple Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, the VCG mechanism is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents' payments will sum to more than 0. Very recently, several mechanisms have been proposed that redistribute a significant percentage of the VCG payments back to the agents while maintaining the other properties. This increases the agents' utilities. One redistribution mechanism dominates another if it always redistributes at least as much to each agent (and sometimes more). In this paper, we provide a characterization of undominated redistribution mechanisms. We also propose several techniques that take a dominated redistribution mechanism as input, and produce as output another redistribution mechanism that dominates the original. One technique immediately produces an undominated redistribution mechanism that is not necessarily anonymous. Another technique preserves anonymity, and repeated application results in an undominated redistribution mechanism in the limit. We show experimentally that these techniques improve the known redistribution mechanisms.