Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
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Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
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MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
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Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments
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Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
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Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
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Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
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Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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Handling self-interest in groups, with minimal cost
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Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
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Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
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Incentive compatible multiagent constraint optimization
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Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: public goods and beyond
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Generalized Partition Mechanism: Framework for Combining Multiple Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Many practical scenarios involve solving a social choice problem: a group of self-interested agents have to agree on an outcome that best fits their combined preferences. We assume that each outcome presents a certain utility to an agent and that the best outcome is the one that maximizes the sum of these utilities. We call a mechanism for solving social choice problems incentive-compatible if for each agent, the behavior that maximizes its own utility is also the one that maximizes the group's utility. One way to achieve incentive-compatibility is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) tax ([5]) mechanism. However, it produces a surplus of taxes that cannot be redistributed to the agents and can severely reduce agents' utilities. Game theory has shown that it is not possible to have a general scheme that is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced and guarantees a Pareto-efficient solution. We present a scheme that sacrifices Pareto-efficiency to achieve budget balance while being both incentive-compatible and individually rational. On randomly generated social choice problems, the scheme results in significantly better overall agent utility than the VCG tax mechanism.