Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A scalable method for multiagent constraint optimization
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
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We present in this paper an incentive-compatible distributed optimization method applied to social choice problems. The method works by computing and collecting VCG taxes in a distributed fashion. This introduces a certain resilience to manipulation from the problem solving agents. An extension of this method sacrifices Pareto-optimality in favor of budget-balance: the solutions chosen are not optimal anymore, but the advantage is that the self interested agents pay the taxes between themselves, thus producing no tax surplus. This eliminates unwanted incentives for the problem solving agents, ensuring their faithfulness.