Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial Auctions
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithmic Game Theory
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Sequential partition mechanism for strongly budget-balanced redistribution
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
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This paper presents a framework for combining multiple strategy-proof resource allocation mechanisms, in which participants are divided into several groups (partitions) and each mechanism is applied to one partition. The idea of dividing participants into several groups is introduced to achieve budget balance in a redistribution mechanism, i.e., the payment (money) collected in one partition is distributed in another partition. Furthermore, this idea has been used to adjust parameters of a mechanism (e.g., the reservation price in an auction) based on the information of participants in one partition in order to improve the mechanism's efficiency or revenue. This paper presents a unified framework called a generalized partition mechanism, in which information, money, and unsold goods can be transferred among partitions. This framework is very general and thus can be applied to various settings, including cases where a redistribution mechanism must adjust parameters to obtain a better social surplus. We provide a sufficient condition on the flow of information, money, and goods among partitions so that the generalized partition mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that each mechanism applied to the partition is strategy-proof. We can use this sufficient condition as a guideline for combining multiple mechanisms. To show the applicability of this guideline, we develop new redistribution mechanisms based on this guideline, in which the utility of a participant can be non-quasi-linear.