Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Minimum cost source location problem with vertex-connectivity requirements in digraphs
Information Processing Letters
Statistical mechanics of complex networks
Statistical mechanics of complex networks
Link spam detection based on mass estimation
VLDB '06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Very large data bases
Combating web spam with trustrank
VLDB '04 Proceedings of the Thirtieth international conference on Very large data bases - Volume 30
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Robust PageRank and locally computable spam detection features
AIRWeb '08 Proceedings of the 4th international workshop on Adversarial information retrieval on the web
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Local computation of PageRank contributions
WAW'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithms and models for the web-graph
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
SybilLimit: a near-optimal social network defense against sybil attacks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Mechanism design for time critical and cost critical task execution via crowdsourcing
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that agents may behave strategically. An emerging phenomenon is to run such mechanisms on a social network; for example, Facebook recently allowed its users to vote on its future terms of use. One significant complication for such mechanisms is that it may be possible for a user to participate multiple times by creating multiple identities. Prior work has investigated the design of false-nameproof mechanisms, which guarantee that there is no incentive to use additional identifiers. Arguably, this work has produced mostly negative results. In this paper, we show that it is in fact possible to create good mechanisms that are robust to false-name-manipulation, by taking the social network structure into account. The basic idea is to exclude agents that are separated from trusted nodes by small vertex cuts. We provide key results on the correctness, optimality, and computational tractability of this approach.