A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
Theoretical Computer Science
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Information and Computation
Approximation algorithms for campaign management
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the fixed-parameter tractability of composition-consistent tournament solutions
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Clone structures in voters' preferences
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
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We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote with a block of these new candidates, ranked consecutively. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on the number of clones as well as on how each voter orders the clones within the block. We formalize what it means for a cloning manipulation to be successful (which turns out to be a surprisingly delicate issue), and, for a number of common voting rules, characterize the preference profiles for which a successful cloning manipulation exists. We also consider the model where there is a cost associated with producing each clone, and study the complexity of finding a minimum-cost cloning manipulation. Finally, we compare cloning with two related problems: the problem of control by adding candidates and the problem of possible (co)winners when new alternatives can join.