Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On problem kernels for possible winner determination under the k-approval protocol
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
Information Processing Letters
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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The POSSIBLE WINNER problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can be made win. Betzler and Dorn [1] proved a result that is only one step away from a full dichotomy of this problem for the important class of pure scoring rules in the case of unweighted voters and an unbounded number of candidates: POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule with vector (2,1,…,1,0), but is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto. We take the final step to a full dichotomy by showing that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete also for the scoring rule with vector (2,1,…,1,0).