Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The complexity of satisfiability problems
STOC '78 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters@? preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and Dorn (2010) [2] proved a result that is only one step away from a full dichotomy of this problem for the important class of pure scoring rules in the case of unweighted votes and an unbounded number of candidates: Possible Winner is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule with vector (2,1,...,1,0), but is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto. We take the final step to a full dichotomy by showing that Possible Winner is NP-complete also for the scoring rule with vector (2,1,...,1,0).