Using complexity to protect elections

Authors:
Piotr Faliszewski;Edith Hemaspaandra;Lane A. Hemaspaandra
Affiliations:
AGH University of Science and Technology, Kraków, Poland;Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY;University of Rochester, Rochester, NY
Venue:
Communications of the ACM
Year:
2010

Citing 35
Cited 31

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Abstract

Computational complexity may truly be the shield against election manipulation.