Elections Can be Manipulated Often

Authors:
Ehud Friedgut;Gil Kalai;Noam Nisan
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Year:
2008

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Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial votingmethod among at least 3 alternatives can be strategicallymanipulated. We prove a quantitative version of theGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a singlerandom voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for everyneutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from beinga dictatorship.