Artificial Intelligence
Asymptotic and finite size parameters for phase transitions: Hamiltonian circuit as a case study
Information Processing Letters
Scaling Effects in the CSP Phase Transition
CP '95 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming
Threshold phenomena in random graph colouring and satisfiability
Threshold phenomena in random graph colouring and satisfiability
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the complexity of manipulating elections
CATS '07 Proceedings of the thirteenth Australasian symposium on Theory of computing - Volume 65
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The Gn,mphase transition is not hard for the Hamiltonian cycle problem
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Winner determination in sequential majority voting
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Manipulating Tournaments in Cup and Round Robin Competitions
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
CLIMA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Solving election manipulation using integer partitioning problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
A hybrid recursive multi-way number partitioning algorithm
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting: an experimental approach
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Control in the presence of manipulators: cooperative and competitive cases
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Discrete Applied Mathematics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case since manipulation is often easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We demonstrate that there is a smooth transition in the probability that a coalition can elect a desired candidate using the veto rule as the size of the manipulating coalition increases. We show that a rescaled probability curve displays a simple and universal form independent of the size of the problem. We argue that manipulation of the veto rule is asymptotically easy for many independent and identically distributed votes even when the coalition of manipulators is critical in size. Based on this argument, we identify a situation in which manipulation is computationally hard. This is when votes are highly correlated and the election is "hung". We show, however, that even a single uncorrelated voter is enough to make manipulation easy again.