Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
On the computational complexity of weighted voting games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Complexity of safe strategic voting
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Computational social choice literature has successfully studied the complexity of manipulation in various voting systems. However, the existing models of coalitional manipulation view the manipulating coalition as an exogenous input, ignoring the question of the coalition formation process. While such analysis is useful as a first approximation, a richer framework is required to model voting manipulation in the real world more accurately, and, in particular, to explain how a manipulating coalition arises and chooses its action. In this paper, we apply tools from cooperative game theory to develop a model that considers the coalition formation process and determines which coalitions are likely to form and what actions they are likely to take. We explore the computational complexity of several standard coalitional game theory solution concepts in our setting, and study the relationship between our model and the classic coalitional manipulation problem as well as the now-standard bribery model.