Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Complexity Theory and Cryptology
Complexity Theory and Cryptology
The complexity of Kemeny elections
Theoretical Computer Science
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
Information Processing Letters
Note: Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
Theoretical Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
FCT'07 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Control complexity in fallback voting
CATS '10 Proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Computing: the Australasian Theory - Volume 109
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Information and Computation
Approximation algorithms for campaign management
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: solving three open problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational social choice: the first four centuries
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students - Computer Science in Service of Democracy
How hard is it to bribe the judges? a study of the complexity of bribery in judgment aggregation
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Cecision making under uncertainty: social choice and manipulation
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Bribery in voting over combinatorial domains is easy
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
On manipulation in multi-winner elections based on scoring rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
On swap-distance geometry of voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
The complexity of losing voters
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
On elections with robust winners
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Resistance to bribery when aggregating soft constraints
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Control in the presence of manipulators: cooperative and competitive cases
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
How to change a group's collective decision?
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Control complexity of schulze voting
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
Discrete Applied Mathematics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change their preferences a specified candidate can be made the election's winner? We study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneous-vs.-nonhomogeneous electorate bribability, bounded-size-vs.-arbitrary-sized candidate sets, weighted-vs.-unweighted voters, and succinct-vs.-nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation (by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NP-complete but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of elections (including plurality, Borda, k- approval,and veto) known as scoring protocols, we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simple-to-evaluate condition that classifies every case as either NP-complete or in P.