Average case complete problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Average-case computational complexity theory
Complexity theory retrospective II
A personal view of average-case complexity
SCT '95 Proceedings of the 10th Annual Structure in Complexity Theory Conference (SCT'95)
Parameterized Complexity Theory (Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Parameterized Complexity Theory (Texts in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson-election winners
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Parameterized Complexity
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of optimal lobbying in threshold aggregation
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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We investigate issues regarding two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Christian et al. [2] showed that optimal lobbying is intractable in the sense of parameterized complexity. We provide an efficient greedy algorithm that achieves a logarithmic approximation ratio for this problem and even for a more general variant--optimal weighted lobbying. We prove that essentially no better approximation ratio than ours can be proven for this greedy algorithm. The problem of determining Dodgson winners is known to be complete for parallel access to NP [11]. Homan and Hemaspaandra [10] proposed an efficient greedy heuristic for finding Dodgson winners with a guaranteed frequency of success, and their heuristic is a "frequently self-knowingly correct algorithm." We prove that every distributional problem solvable in polynomial time on the average with respect to the uniform distribution has a frequently self-knowingly correct polynomialtime algorithm. Furthermore, we study some features of probability weight of correctness with respect to Procaccia and Rosenschein's junta distributions [15].