Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters

Authors:
Shahar Dobzinski;Ariel D. Procaccia
Affiliations:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel 91904;Microsoft Israel R&D Center, Herzeliya, Israel 46725
Venue:
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2008

Citing 15
Cited 8

Dichotomy for voting systems

Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators

Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable

Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability

Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Copeland voting: ties matter

Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Elections Can be Manipulated Often

FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate

AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination

IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard

IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting

FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation

ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
On approximating optimal weighted lobbying, and frequency of correctness versus average-case polynomial time

FCT'07 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Fundamentals of Computation Theory

Using complexity to protect elections

Communications of the ACM
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Multimode control attacks on elections

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives

SIAM Journal on Computing
A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality

STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Election manipulation: the average case

ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.02

Visualization

Abstract

The recent result of Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan [9] gives a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem regarding manipulation in elections, but holds only for neutral social choice functions and three alternatives. We complement their theorem by proving a similar result regarding Pareto-Optimal social choice functions when the number of voters is two. We discuss the implications of our results with respect to the agenda of precluding manipulation in elections by means of computational hardness.