Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

Authors:
Michael Zuckerman;Ariel D. Procaccia;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Affiliations:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel;The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel;The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Venue:
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be hard in a variety of voting rules. We put forward efficient algorithms for the problem in Scoring rules, Maximum and Plurality with runoff, and analyze their windows of error. Specifically, given an instance on which an algorithm fails, we bound the additional power the manipulators need in order to succeed. We finally discuss the implications of our results with respect to the popular approach of employing computational hardness to preclude manipulation.