Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections

Authors:
Reshef Meir;Ariel D. Procaccia;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein;Aviv Zohar
Affiliations:
School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Venue:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multiwinner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.