When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
From DPS to MAS to ...: continuing the trends
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
Multiagent systems, and the search for appropriate foundations
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elections of an assembly or committee; that work provided an initial understanding of the topic. In this paper, we paint a more complete picture of the topic, investigating four prominent multi-winner voting rules. First, we characterize the complexity of manipulation and control in these voting rules under various kinds of formalizations of the manipulator's goal. Second, we extend the results about complexity of control to various well-known types of control. This work enhances our comprehension of which multi-winner voting rules should be employed in various settings.