Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination

Authors:
Ariel D. Procaccia;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein;Aviv Zohar
Affiliations:
School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Venue:
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we fully characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems. Additionally, we show that several tailor-made multi-winner voting schemes are impractical, as it is NP-hard to select the winners in these schemes.