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Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
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Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [8], with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of candidates, and we adapt it here so as to keep its useful features with respect to approval strategies even in the presence of control actions. We prove that this system is computationally resistant (i.e., the corresponding control problems are np-hard) to at least 16 out of 20 types of constructive and destructive control. Thus, for the 20 control types studied here, SP-AV has more resistances to control, by at least two, than is currently known for any other natural voting system with a polynomial-time winner problem.