Approximability of manipulating elections

Authors:
Eric Brelsford;Piotr Faliszewski;Edith Hemaspaandra;Henning Schnoor;Ilka Schnoor
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY;Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY;Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY;Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY;Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY
Venue:
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Year:
2008

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Abstract

In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomial time approximation schemes) as well as obtain inapproximability results.